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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) and (j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its application of relevant precedent 
to the facts of this case. 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declining to consider Petitioners' 
discussion of Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987), and Smith v. 
Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919 (Utah 2004), in their reply brief on appeal and in treating similar 
contentions as not being raised in their initial brief. 
"On certiorari, we review for correctness the decision of the court of appeals, not 
the decision of the district court." Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12,1} 9, 179 P.3d 775; 
See also, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n, 2006 UT 58, f^ 8, 147 
P.3d 1189; Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, ^ 8, 27 P.3d 538. "The correctness of the court 
of appeals' decision turns on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's 
decision under the appropriate standard of review." Butler, 2008 UT 12, ^ j 9; Clark, 2001 
UT 44, ]f 8. Review in certiorari is further circumscribed by the issues raised in the 
questions presented for review. Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 
(Utah 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
There are no constitutional provisions or statutes directly applicable to the legal 
issues present in this matter. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a dispute regarding the sale of a vacant, undeveloped lot from 
Country Living Development, LLC, ("Country Living Development") to David and 
Kristine Anderson ("the Andersons"). Matthew Kriser acted as agent for Country Living 
Development and facilitated the sale. After the sale, the Andersons engaged David's 
father, Norman Anderson, a licensed contractor, to build a home on the lot they had 
purchased. Some years after Norman Anderson built the home, David and Kristine noted 
cracks in the foundation caused by settling in the soil. The Anderson's thereafter brought 
suit against Matthew Kriser personally, alleging fraudulent nondisclosure of collapsible 
soils. The Andersons did not bring suit against Country Living Development, LLC, nor 
against Norman Anderson. 
At the time of the transaction that forms the basis of this action, Defendant and 
Appellee Matthew Kriser was an employee and shareholder of Country Living 
Development, LLC. (Record p. 139-40). Country Living Development was engaged in 
developing real estate in the Aspen Cove real estate development in Pleasant Grove, 
Utah. (Record p. 108). As an employee of Country Living Development, Matthew 
Kriser's responsibilities were to oversee the sales and marketing of land held by Country 
Living Development. (Record p. 108, 139-40). Drew Kriser was also an employee and 
shareholder of Country Living Development. (Record p. 108). Drew's primary 
responsibilities were to oversee the subdivision approvals and compliance with municipal 
regulatory requirements for development projects. Id. In 1997, in compliance with the 
regulatory requirements of Pleasant Grove, Country Living Development, engaged 
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Earthtec Inc., a geotechnical and soils testing firm, to perform soils tests for the Aspen 
Cove development. (Record p. 105, 139-40). The Earthtec soils report indicated that 
some portions of the Aspen Cove development contained mild to moderate collapsible 
soils that would require compaction before building. (Record p. 110-37). The report 
does not say that any of the subdivision was unsuitable for building. Id. Mr. Kriser does 
not take issue with the Andersons recital of the contents of the report. The report speaks 
for itself. In compliance with local ordinance, the Earthtec soils report was filed with the 
city of Pleasant Grove for public inspection. (Record p. 105; Record p. 96). It is 
undisputed that up until the Andersons filed suit against him personally, Matthew Kriser 
never saw the report nor did he have knowledge of its contents. (Record p. 105, 139-
140). 
In 1998, the Andersons approached Country Living Development, through 
Matthew Kriser, and expressed interest in purchasing a vacant lot in the Aspen Cove 
development. (Record p. 108, 139-140). At the beginning of the transaction, Mr. Kriser 
signed, as agent for Country Living Development, an offer to purchase. (Record p. 224). 
The sale transaction culminated in the Andersons purchasing a residential lot from 
Country Living Development. (Record p. 108, 259). The warranty deed specifically 
designates Country Living Development, LLC, as the seller. (Record p. 259). Matthew 
Kriser signed the deed as "manager" of Country Living Development, LLC. Id. 
In 1998, prior to and during the sale to the Andersons, Matthew Kriser understood 
that cities regularly require soils tests to be performed as part of the process of approving 
the road development within a subdivision, but did not know whether one had in fact 
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been performed for the Aspen Cove development. (Record p. 105, 139-40). Moreover, 
at the time of the sale to the Plaintiffs, Matthew Kriser did not understand or know that 
the Aspen Cove soils test made any recommendations for construction regarding 
residential lots in the Aspen Cove development. Id. Matthew Kriser did not see the 
Earthtec soils report prior to the sale to the Plaintiffs. Id. There are no disputes of fact in 
regards to Mr. Kriser's knowledge at the time of the sale to the Andersons. In 2007, Mr. 
Kriser indicated to the Andersons that he had reviewed the contents of Earthtec report 
after this suit had been filed. (Record p. 193). 
After purchasing the property in question, the Andersons employed David's father, 
Norman Anderson as the general contractor and builder of their home located on the 
property in question. (Record p. 96). Prior to building the Andersons' home, Norman 
Anderson had built five other homes. (Record p. 99). Norman Anderson failed to check 
with Pleasant Grove City concerning any soils testing that had been done for the Aspen 
Cove development and therefore failed to discover the Earthtec soils test report. (Record 
p. 96). Norman Anderson failed to compact the soils underlying the footings for the 
Andersons home. (Record p. 99, 103). Norman Anderson failed to compact the soils that 
were used to fill around the basement walls, after the footings, foundation, and basement 
walls were formed. Id. Some years later the Andersons discovered settling in the soil 
underlying and surrounding their home and developing cracks in the foundation and 
basement walls. Thereafter the Andersons brought suit against Matthew Kriser 
personally, alleging he had fraudulently failed to disclose the existence of the soils report 
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or that the soils report indicated that some areas of the subdivision had some collapsible 
soils. 
After the completion of discovery in the case, Matthew Kriser filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, arguing that the undisputed evidence showed (1) that the Andersons 
had failed to produce any evidence that he had knowledge of the contents and 
recommendations of the soils report, an essential element in any fraudulent non-
disclosure cause of action, (2) that in arranging the sale, Mr. Kriser had acted as agent for 
Country Living Development and could not be held personally liable, and (3) that Mr. 
Kriser personally had no duty to disclose the soils report because he does not qualify as 
the builder-contractor as defined by Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919, and 
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283, especially since Norman 
Anderson had built the home and failed to build it in compliance with the 
recommendations of the soils report. (Record p. 96, 99, 103). Based on this undisputed 
evidence the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Matthew Kriser and made 
the finding that there was no evidence that Mr. Kriser had knowledge of the contents of 
the soils report. Thus, the Andersons' representations that Mr. Kriser had knowledge of 
the report are false. Mr. Kriser had knowledge that a report would normally have been 
ordered for a development. (Record p. 105, 139-40). Mr. Kriser had no knowledge that 
one had been ordered for the Aspen Cove development, and he absolutely had no 
knowledge of the contents of any report. (Record p. 105, 139-40). This is an undisputed 
fact. 
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In response to the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the Andersons took an 
appeal and the matter was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. After briefing, the 
Utah Court of Appeals issued a decision upholding the ruling of the trial court. Anderson 
v. Kriser, 2009 UT App 319, (unpublished opinion, see Addendum A to Petitioners' 
Brief). This Court granted certiorari to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in its 
application of precedent to the facts of this case, and whether the Court of Appeals erred 
in declining to consider the Petitioners' discussion regarding the imputation of 
knowledge upon real estate developers. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In making their arguments in favor of overturning the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, the Andersons conveniently omit two dispositive facts: (1) Mr. Kriser was not 
the developer of the Andersons' vacant lot, and (2) the Andersons, not Mr. Kriser, hired a 
relative and directed the construction of their own home. 
The Andersons brought a single cause of action for fraudulent concealment against 
Matthew Kriser. "The three elements of fraudulent concealment are best described in this 
order: (1) there is a legal duty to communicate information, (2) the nondisclosed 
information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) the nondisclosed 
information is material." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, ^ 35, 143 P.3d 
283. Before the Court of Appeals, the parties briefed the two issues upon which the trial 
court based its decision: (1) whether Mr. Kriser had a duty to disclose information and (2) 
whether Mr. Kriser had knowledge of the information that was allegedly not disclosed. 
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The trial court did not reach the question of whether the information was material, and 
neither the Court of Appeals nor the parties have addressed it here. 
Whether Mr. Kriser has a duty to disclose depends upon his relationship to the 
Andersons. If he is the builder-contractor in relation to the Andersons, then he has a duty 
to disclose. Similarly, if he is the developer of the Andersons' property then he would 
have a similar duty to disclose knowledge that he possesses, if the Andersons had 
requested such information. 
Whether Mr. Kriser had actual knowledge of the existence and contents of the 
report is undisputed. He had no such knowledge. The factual record on this issue is 
unequivocal. However, the Andersons assert that knowledge of the existence and 
contents of the soils report can be imputed upon Mr. Kriser because, they allege, he was 
the developer of the Anderson's property. Although it is clear from the case law that a 
builder-contractor may have knowledge imputed upon him under certain specific 
circumstances, it is not clear that such knowledge may also be imputed to the developer. 
Loveland v. Orem City Corp,, 746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 1987). This is especially true 
when the relationship between developer and purchaser is interrupted by the presence of 
an actual builder-contractor who negligently built the Andersons'' home. Smith v. 
Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, ^ 21, 94 P.3d 919. The Court of Appeals, in handling these 
questions, addressed the matter by treating Mr. Kriser as a developer in relation to the 
Andersons, without analysis, and thereby did not address the question of whether Mr. 
Kriser owed the Andersons a duty of disclosure. Rather, the Court of Appeals assumed 
this issue without deciding it, because it found the question of knowledge dispositive. 
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Anderson v. Kriser, 2009 UT App 319, note 1. The Court of Appeals determined that 
Mr. Kriser did not have actual knowledge of the existence or the contents of the soils 
report, and also determined that the failures of the builder-contractor intervened to sever 
any liability on the part of the developer. Id. The Court of Appeals did not address the 
question of whether knowledge could be imputed upon the developer, and held that the 
Andersons only raised this issue in their reply brief, thereby making it inappropriate for 
the Court of Appeals to address. Id. 
This Court has granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals was 
correct in its disposition of the case, and whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing 
to address the question of whether knowledge can be imputed upon a developer. 
The case law is ambiguous about whether such knowledge can be imputed upon a 
developer. Under the facts of this case, such knowledge cannot be imputed because of 
the existence of an intervening builder-contractor. Moreover, although the Court of 
Appeals assumed without deciding that Mr. Kriser, not Country Living Development, 
LLC, was the developer of the Andersons' property, the factual record indisputably 
establishes that he was not the developer of the Andersons' property, and therefore had 
no duty of disclosure. In approaching these issues, the question of whether Mr. Kriser 
had a duty to disclose and whether he is the developer will be addressed first. Second, 
the question of knowledge and imputation of knowledge will be addressed. Finally, the 
matter of the intervening negligence of the builder-contractor, along with the actual 
disclosure of the soils report to the builder-contractor will be addressed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. MR. KRISER HAD NO DUTY TO DISCLOSE THE SOILS REPORT 
TO THE ANDERSONS BECAUSE HE IS NOT THE DEVELOPER 
OF THE ANDERSON'S PROPERTY. 
In fraudulent nondisclosure cases, the duty to disclose can arise through several 
mediums. The definitive case on the duty to disclose is First Security Bank of Utah v. 
Banberry Development Corp., 786 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1990). A full analysis under 
Banberry is not necessary in this matter because other cases have already established that 
a duty to disclose exists under certain important contractual relationships. This duty to 
disclose is in contravention of the doctrine of caveat emptor in cases where the allegedly 
non-disclosing party has superior knowledge and expertise concerning the matter, and 
where the information is not easily discovered. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, fflf 
25-26, 48 P.3d 235. In cases of collapsible soils on residential lots, appellate courts have 
already determined that certain parties owe a duty to disclose the soil conditions. Thus, a 
builder-contractor of a home has a duty to disclose any negative soils conditions. Smith, 
2004 UT 55, fflf 20-21. Similarly, a developer has a duty to disclose conditions which 
make a lot unsuitable for residential building.1 Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769; Yazd, 2006 
1
 Because of superior knowledge and expertise of the builder-contractor, the courts have 
gone so far as to impute knowledge of collapsible soils conditions upon the builder-
contractor, and require that such information be disclosed, regardless of whether it is 
actually known or not. The rationale behind this is that the expertise and professional 
duty of care of the builder-contractor requires him to discover this information before 
beginning construction, and because the builder-contractor should know this information, 
he is also required to disclose it to the homeowner. Smith, 2004 UT 55, ffl[ 20-21. The 
Andersons now seek to extend this rule to developers. This issue will be addressed in a 
separate section below. 
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UT 47, |^ 24. It is not clear from the cases that a developer has an automatic duty to 
disclose a soils report when the report does not say that the land is 'unsuitable' but only 
says that some remedial measures must be taken when constructing a residential building. 
Id. In fact, the cases indicate that such information need only be disclosed "upon 
inquiry". Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769. Finally, a seller with actual knowledge of defects 
in the property which are not easily discovered by inspection must be disclosed to a 
buyer. Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, \ 25. 
In the present case, Mr. Kriser does not qualify as a builder-contractor. There is 
no factual dispute on this point. Mr. Kriser did not build the home and did not contract 
for any work to be done on the property. Mr. Kriser never owned the property in 
question. Mr. Kriser, acting as agent for Country Living Development, LLC, signed the 
deed conveying the vacant lot from Country Living to the Andersons. (Record p. 108, 
259). Neither Mr. Kriser, nor his principal Country Living, ever built or constructed the 
home which forms the subject matter of this action. 
Similarly, Mr. Kriser is not the seller of the property. The deed clearly indicates 
that Country Living Development, LLC is the seller. (Record p. 108, 259). Mr. Kriser 
acted as agent and manager of Country Living in that transaction. Id, Moreover, it is an 
undisputed fact that even if Mr. Kriser were the seller, he had no actual knowledge of the 
defect. 
As to the issue of whether Mr. Kriser was the developer of the property in 
question, the facts and law are similarly clear. Mr. Kriser was not the developer of the 
property. Country Living Development, LLC, Mr. Kriser's employer, was the developer 
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of the property and Mr. Kriser acted merely as employee and agent for Country Living 
Development in the transaction. As to the agency status of Mr. Kriser, the undisputed 
facts are as follows: that at the time of sale to the Andersons, Mr. Kriser was an 
employee and shareholder of Country Living Development, LLC; that Country Living 
Development, LLC, was developing the Aspen Cove subdivision, where the subject 
property is located; that Mr. Kriser's primary responsibilities in working for Country 
Living Development, LLC, were to manage the marketing and sales of Aspen Cove 
development properties; that the Andersons bought the subject property in the Aspen 
Cove development; that the warranty deed for the subject property to the Andersons lists 
Country Living Development, LLC, as seller; and that Mr. Kriser signed the seller's 
signature line as "manager" on the warranty deed. It is clear that Mr. Kriser was acting 
as an agent, was not the actual developer, and that his agency status protects him from 
personal liability. An agent is not personally liable for acts undertaken on behalf of a 
principal. Charlton v. Hackett, 360 P.2d 176, 177 (Utah 1961); see also, Wardley Better 
Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, ffif 19-20, 63 P.3d 1009. "If a contract is 
made with a known agent acting within the scope of his authority for a disclosed 
principal, contract is that of the principal alone and the agent cannot be held liable." 
Carlie v. Morgan, 966 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). Taking all of the 
undisputed facts together, it is clear that Mr. Kriser was the agent for Country Living 
2
 If the Andersons had brought their claim against Country Living Development, LLC, 
rather than Mr. Kriser personally, the analysis of the liability of a developer may very 
well be different. 
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Development and that Country Living Development, not Mr. Kriser, was the developer of 
the property. 
The Andersons make much of the fact that in the opening questions of his 
deposition, Mr. Kriser described his occupation as a "builder-developer". (Record, p. 
204). The Andersons have latched on to this statement as somehow conclusive of the 
proposition that Mr. Kriser was the developer of the Andersons' property. This assertion 
is false and misleading. Mr. Kriser has long been employed by various development 
companies, and consequently, as a lay-person, he described his occupation as a builder 
and developer of real estate. Such an occupational self description is very different from 
an admission to a legal term of art that Mr. Kriser was in fact the developer of the 
Andersons' property. The surrounding facts, as articulated above, demonstrate that Mr. 
Kriser was not the developer of the Andersons' property. The Andersons' attempt to 
capitalize on Mr. Kriser's lay description of his occupation as an admission that he is the 
legally defined developer of the Andersons' property is misleading and inappropriate. 
Country Living Development, LLC, not Mr. Kriser, is the developer of the Andersons' 
property. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Kriser was the developer of the Andersons 
property, Utah case law does not impose upon Mr. Kriser an automatic duty to disclose a 
soils report which only indicates that in some areas of the subdivision some soils 
compaction may be required before building. Loveland states that a developer "has a 
duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for 
construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling house and he must disclose to 
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his purchaser any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to know makes the 
subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building." 746 P.2d at 769 (emphasis 
altered). More importantly, Loveland goes on to explain that a developer "has a further 
duty to disclose, upon inquiry, information he has developed in the course of the 
subdivision process which is relevant to suitability of the land for its expected use." Id. 
(emphasis added). The plain reading of this language in Loveland is that a developer has 
an absolute duty to disclose information which he knows or ought to know make the 
property unsuitable for residential building. However, if the information he has 
discovered does not make the land unsuitable for residential building but rather is only 
"relevant to the suitability of the land for its expected use" then such information need 
only be disclosed "upon inquiry". 
In the present case, it is undisputed that the soils report does not indicate that the 
property is unsuitable for residential building, but only indicates that throughout the 
subdivision there were some areas of collapsible soils requiring compaction prior to 
building. Indeed, the Aspen Cove Subdivision is now fully developed with houses. The 
land was not and is not "unsuitable for such residential building". The Andersons' home 
is the only home in the subdivision that has developed settling and cracking in the 
foundation, and this is because Norman Anderson, Mr. Anderson's father, failed to obtain 
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the soils report from the city when the building permit was issued, and failed to compact 
the soils.3 
Furthermore, it is also undisputed that neither the Andersons, nor the builder-
contractor Norman Anderson, ever made an inquiry to Mr. Kriser or Country Living 
regarding the condition of the soils, or a soils report. Loveland, upon which the 
Andersons rely so heavily, specifically states that a developer need only disclose 
information "relevant to the suitability of the land for its expected use" "upon inquiry". 
746 P.2d at 769. There is no evidence in the record that such inquiry was made, and in 
fact it was not made. Consequently, even assuming that Mr. Kriser was the developer of 
the Anderson's property, there was no duty to disclose the soils report unless the 
Andersons' had inquired about soil conditions, which they did not do. 
II. MR. KRISER HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOILS REPORT 
AND SUCH KNOWLEDGE CANNOT BE IMPUTED UPON HIM. 
The second element for making out a fraudulent concealment case is to show that 
at the time of the transaction, the defendant had knowledge of the information in question 
and failed to disclose it. Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, f^ 24. The burden for proving this 
knowledge rests with the plaintiff. Id. "Fraudulent concealment. . . requires the seller to 
have acted "knowingly and recklessly." Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, ]f 36 n. 12, 
158P.3d562 
3
 The effects of this failure and its legal consequences to this case are addressed in a 
separate section below. 
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In Fennell v. Green, a fraudulent concealment case, failure by the plaintiff to show 
that the seller had knowledge of the defects shown in a soils study necessarily meant that 
there could have been no duty on the part of the seller, and therefore was fatal to a 
buyer's claim for fraudulent non-disclosure. 2003 UT App 291, ^ 12, 77 P.3d 339. 
Similarly, the Andersons had to show that at the time of the transaction Mr. Kriser had 
knowledge of the contents of the soils study and failed to disclose it. See e.g., 
Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, ][ 24. The burden for proving this knowledge rests with the 
Andersons. Id. All the evidence shows that, at the time of the sale to the Andersons, Mr. 
Kriser had no knowledge that any soils test for the development existed or that it made 
any recommendations regarding the construction of homes in the subdivision. (Record p. 
105, 139-40). There is no evidence which contradicts these statements. The Andersons 
sought to offer evidence concerning Mr. Kriser's knowledge in 2007, after the lawsuit 
was filed, as if it were evidence of his knowledge in 1998 when the sale occurred. The 
Andersons state that after this lawsuit was filed in April of 2007, Mr. Kriser visited the 
Andersons in their home and mentioned that he had reviewed the soils study after suit 
was filed and that the soils study showed a test pit in the front of their property. (Record 
p. 193). The Court of Appeals recognized that this statement is irrelevant. Anderson, 
2009 UT App 319, \ 5. Mr. Kriser's knowledge of the soils study in 2007 has no 
relevance to his knowledge of the contents of the report in 1998, the time of the sale to 
the Andersons. Because there is no evidence to support the knowledge element for a 
cause of action of fraudulent concealment, the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming 
the decision of the trial court. 
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In spite of the Mr. Kriser's indisputable lack of knowledge of the soils report, the 
Andersons argue that such knowledge could be imputed upon Mr. Kriser because he was 
the developer of the Andersons' property. This argument was raised for the first time in 
the Andersons' reply brief before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals was 
correct in declining to address this argument, and moreover, this argument fails on the 
merits. 
The Court of Appeals correctly declined to address this argument because the 
Andersons raised it for the first time in their reply brief. The Andersons make much ado 
about the fact that they quoted language from Yazd in their opening brief and cited the 
same language from Loveland in their reply brief, and that the Court of Appeals mistook 
this change to mean that the argument had not been briefed previously. Not so. 
Although it is correct that the Andersons quoted a portion of Yazd which might be used to 
support an argument in favor of imputation of knowledge on a developer, the fact is that 
the Andersons did not use this language in support of such an argument. Rather, the 
Andersons used the quote for the proposition that Mr. Kriser had the expertise of a 
developer and therefore there is no way he could not have known of the report. The 
Andersons argued that Mr. Kriser "must have known that a soils report had been done." 
(See Appellants' Brief to the Court of Appeals, pages 12-13). This is different from the 
argument that knowledge which Mr. Kriser did not have should nevertheless be imputed 
upon Mr. Kriser as a developer. That argument was first articulated in the Andersons' 
reply brief. (See Appellants' Reply Brief to the Court of Appeals, pages 5-7). Quoting a 
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particular case is not the same as linking that case to a legal argument. Thus, the Court of 
Appeals was correct in declining to address it. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals was correct in declining to address the argument 
because it was not preserved in the trial court below. A simple review of the record 
confirms this to be true. The Andersons never raised the argument in any of the briefing 
before the trial court. Consequently, even if the arguments of the Andersons in their 
opening brief can be construed to include an argument for the imputation of knowledge 
upon developers, such argument was not preserved before the trial court, and any error on 
the part of the Court of Appeals in refusing to consider it was harmless. The same result 
would have been reached because the Andersons never raised that argument before the 
trial court. 
On the merits, the Andersons' argument for imputation of knowledge against Mr. 
Kriser fails, first because Mr. Kriser is not the Andersons' developer, as articulated 
above, and second, because neither case law nor public policy supports an extension of 
the rule imputing knowledge upon developers. 
Utah law imputes the knowledge of soil conditions upon a builder-contractor. 
Smith, 2004 UT 55, fflf 20-21. The reasons for this imputation of knowledge are based on 
the practicalities of homebuilding and are founded in good public policy. In building a 
home, a contractor is under a duty to construct the home in accordance with the regular 
standard of care required by his profession. The builder-contractor necessarily is 
involved in the excavation, design, and construction of the improvements on the soils he 
encounters during the construction process. The standard of care requires that a builder 
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know whether the home he is planning on building will be subject to foundation shifts 
and collapsible soils. Hence, in order to not negligently build a home, a builder-
contractor must know of the soils conditions. Because a builder-contractor is required by 
his own professional standard of care to know of the soils conditions of the land on which 
he is building a home, it is fair and proper for the builder-contractor to be required to 
disclose such knowledge to the homeowner. Consequently, even if a builder-contractor 
has no such actual knowledge, he is presumed to have such knowledge because his 
profession requires it. Smith v. Frandsen, outlines this reasoning by stating that a 
builder-contractor owes "independent duties" which support the imposition of knowledge 
and that a builder-contractor's "knowledge and expertise" in his profession gave the 
builder-contractor the "'adequate time and opportunity' to discover the subsurface defects 
in the property in question." 2004 UT 55, f^ 21. Thus, builder-contractors can have the 
knowledge of soils conditions imputed upon them. 
The same principles do not apply to a developer. A developer of property 
prepares property for subdivision, building, and economic development. A developer 
does not and cannot predict or know the purpose to which subsequent purchasers will put 
the property. Although residential construction was contemplated in this particular case, 
creating a rule imposing knowledge upon all developers would create a rule which is too 
broad and too blunt. Many developers do not know the purposes for which the property 
is to be developed or the particular size, configuration or planned construction techniques 
for the improvements that may be constructed on the property. A better and more precise 
rule is the one already present in Utah, which is best articulated in Loveland. This is that 
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a developer is under a duty to disclose information which he knows or ought to know that 
reveals that a property is unsuitable for the residential building, when such residential 
building is contemplated by the subdivision. 746 P.2d at 769. If there is information 
available that is relevant to the suitability of the land for its expected use, then that 
information should be disclosed upon inquiry. Id. The Andersons ask this Court to 
create a new rule of law imposing knowledge of soils reports on all developers and 
mandating disclosure of the reports regardless of their contents or recommendations. The 
reason the Andersons must assert this new rule is because the Andersons' cause of action 
fails under existing case law. Rather than change the law, as the Andersons request, this 
Court should follow it's prior decisions in Loveland, Smith, and Yazd. 
The Andersons seek to emphasize the language in Loveland which states that a 
developer must disclose information that he "knows or reasonably ought to know makes 
the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building." 746 P.2d at 769. This 
statement does support the proposition that some knowledge of information can be 
imputed upon a developer. Knowledge of information making the land completely 
unsuitable for residential building may be imputed upon a developer.4 However, as 
stated before, this imputation of knowledge is limited to the scenario where the 
information makes the lots completely unsuitable for residential building. Such is not the 
case here. The lots of the Aspen Cove Subdivision are residential with residential homes 
4
 More importantly, since Country Living Development, LLC, and not Mr. Kriser, was 
the actual developer of the Andersons' property, this case does not present sufficient 
factual basis for the Court to define the scope of a developer's duty to a buyer of a lot. 
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built on them. The information here did not make the homes unsuitable for residential 
building. Consequently, this phrase implying some imputation of knowledge does not 
have application to the facts of this case. 
Finally, it is important to reemphasize that Mr. Kriser is not the developer of the 
Andersons' property, and as such, no knowledge can be imputed upon him personally. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in upholding the ruling of the trial court. 
III. THE SOILS REPORT WAS DISCLOSED TO THE BUILDER OF 
THE ANDERSONS' HOME AND THE BUILDER-CONTRACTOR'S 
NEGLIGENCE SEVERS MR. KRISER'S ALLEGED LIABILITY. 
Finally, as the Court of Appeals correctly determined, the failures of the actual 
builder of the Andersons' home sever any liability against Mr. Kriser, or any developer. 
Norman Anderson, Mr. Anderson's father, built the Andersons' home. (Record, p. 96). 
Norman Anderson had relatively little experience building homes, and had only built five 
homes prior to this one. (Record, p. 99). 
In Smith v. Frandsen, a fraudulent concealment action regarding allegations of a 
failure to disclose soils tests, this Court held that, "as a matter of law," a reasonably 
prudent builder-contractor should have the expertise to investigate and discover 
insufficient compaction on the lot on which he is building, regardless of any lack of 
experience. 2004 UT 55, ^  20. Thus, the duty of a builder-contractor to ensure adequate 
compaction, including inquiry at city offices regarding soils tests filed with the city for 
public inspection, is a legal, not a factual question. If the builder-contractor has failed to 
check with the city, has failed to obtain a soils test, and has failed to ensure adequate 
compaction, then, as a matter of law, he has been derelict in his duty. Id. 
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The failure of a builder-contractor to ensure adequate compaction, obtain a soils 
test, or review the soils report filed with the city, severs the duties and potential liability 
of previous owners. 
Where a developer conveys property to a residential 
contractor, the knowledge and expertise of the builder, and 
the independent duties owed thereby, interrupt certain 
obligations running from the initial developer to subsequent 
purchasers. In other words, borrowing from the language of 
the Restatement, we find that conveying to one having 
"adequate time and opportunity" to discover the subsurface 
defects in [the property in question], [the defendant] incurred 
no liability to remote purchasers of the property as a matter of 
law. 
Id. at Tf 21 (citation omitted). 
In the present case, Norman Anderson, the builder-contractor, failed to ensure that 
adequate compaction occurred. He did not check with the city for the soils test that had 
been filed there. (Record p. 96). He did not compact the ground around the footings, the 
foundation, and the basement walls. (Record p. 99, 103). This failure is the proximate 
cause for the Plaintiffs' alleged cracking and foundation problems in their home. 
According to Smith, Norman Anderson's failure to check for the publicly filed soils 
report severs any liability to previous owners or developers. While the facts of this case 
differ somewhat from the facts of Smith, since the lot was conveyed by the developer to 
the homeowner, who contracted with a builder for the construction of the home, that 
difference is not significant to the principle espoused. That is, the independent duties of a 
residential contractor interrupt certain obligations running from the initial developer. 
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Furthermore, Utah law indicates that filing the soils report with the city and 
making it available for public inspection is a factor that a court can consider when 
determining whether the seller filled his duty to the buyer to disclose material defects. 
Fennell, 2003 UT App 291, \ 2. Country Living Development, LLC, satisfied its 
disclosure duties, the builder-contractor failed in his duties to ensure adequate 
compaction. That failure severs liability. 
The Andersons attempt to distinguish Smith v. Frandsen by highlighting some 
minor factual differences. In Smith, the developer transferred the property to the builder-
contractor, who negligently built the home on collapsible soils and failed to disclose the 
soils problems. The plaintiffs sought recovery from the developer. The court denied this 
cause of action, finding that the actions and failures of the builder-contractor interrupted 
any failures by the developer and severed liability. The Andersons seek to distinguish 
this remarkably similar situation by emphasizing that title to the property passed through 
the builder-contractor. However, this was not the fact which the Smith Court found 
persuasive. Rather it was "the knowledge and expertise of the builder, and the 
independent duties owed thereby, [which] interrupt certain obligations running from the 
initial developer to subsequent purchasers." Smith, 2004 UT 55, ^ 21. Thus, it was the 
standard of care and the professional duties of the builder-contractor, and not the fact that 
title passed through him, which interrupted liability to the developer. 
This holding in Smith makes sense on other grounds. It does not make sense that a 
contractual principle, i.e. privity of contract, would serve to interrupt tortious liability. 
Rather, a plain reading of Smith shows that it was a tort principle, that of a breach of the 
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duty of care by the builder-contractor, which operates to interrupt liability to the 
developer. Id. Thus, both a plain reading of Smith v. Frandsen, as well as a clear 
understanding of the legal principles upon which it was based, demonstrate that Smith 
directly applies to the facts of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals reached the correct conclusion in this case and determined 
that Mr. Kriser was not liable for information he did not know, and had no duty to 
disclose even if he had known it. Mr. Kriser was not the developer of the Andersons' 
property, and knowledge cannot be imputed upon him. The failures of Norman Anderson 
to properly construct the Andersons' home interrupt liability to any other party. The 
decision of the Court of Appeals and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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